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RESCISSION OF BARGAINS MADE ON SUNDAY
WALTER WHEELER CooK*

In the great majority of the American states the transaction of business on Sunday is wholly or in large part forbidden, the penalties for
violation of the prohibition being generally a small fine, at least for the
first offense.' These statutes do not as a rule specifically provide what
effect if any they shall have in the way of making Sunday transactions
void or unenforceable as between the parties.2 American courts have
with few exceptions, and perhaps naturally enough in view of the English decisions, applied the general notions developed in our legal system with reference to the effects of illegal bargains in general. 3 This
has had interesting, and, to the layman at least, somewhat startling results. A typical example is the case of Thompson v. Williams.4 The
seller sued the buyer in assumpsit for the price of two cows, sold and
delivered to the defendant on Sunday, to be paid for later. Some time
after the delivery of the cows the seller had taken the cows from the
* U. S. Treasury Department, Washington, D. C., Professor of Law, The Johns
Hopkins University (on leave).
',,The prohibition of certain employments or undertakings on Sunday is statutory. Aside from such statutes, contracts are not invalidated because made or
to be performed on that day. Statutes have, however, generally been passed
prohibiting certain transactions on Sunday. These statutes go back for their
original to an English statute enacted in 1677.
"The terms of modern American statutes vary ...
"Statutes in most States forbid all contracts and sales not of necessity or charity, but are not always so wide.
"A statute forbidding secular labor and business does indeed make all sales
and contracts to sell, as well as other bargains, illegal; but if, as in the early
English statute, only business within a person's 'ordinary calling' is forbidden,
a contract or sale which is outside of such calling is not forbidden. So in some
States only public sales and publicly offering to sell are forbidden. And still
other statutes are directed merely against labor. The more common form of
statute, however, prohibits all contracts and sales not of necessity or charity."
-RESTATEMENT,

CoN

Acrs (1932),

p. 1039, hereinafter referred to merely as

"RESTATEMENT."

'The statement in the Special Note on p. 1040 of the RESTATEmENT that "the
law as to the effect of a transaction entered into on Sunday is wholly statutory"
is doubtless an inadvertence. The Introductory Note on the preceding page
rather clearly indicates that the statutes in question prescribe only the penal, not
the civil, consequences of Sunday bargains.
'Note the wide definition of "illegal" in Section 512 of the RESTATEMENT:

"A bargain is illegal within the meaning of the Restatement of this Subject if
either its formation or its performance is criminal, tortious, or otherwise opposed
to public policy." §§598 et seq. of the R.ESTATEMENT give a general summary of
the law as to the effects of illegal bargains in general. Note that the Sunday law
bargains differ from all others in that the only illegality is in the making of the
bargain, not in the acts to be done.
'58 N. H. 248 (1878).
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buyer because of his refusal to pay for them. The buyer then sued the
seller in an action of trespass and, in spite of the fact that the buyer had
never paid for the cows, recovered and collected a judgment for their
value, the jury fixing the damages at the contract price agreed upon
when the illegal bargain was made. It was held that even though the
buyer had in the trespass action claimed title to the cows, the seller could
not recover in the assumpsit action.
To a layman this outcome is rather astonishing. Both parties were
equally guilty of violating the Sunday law; the offense was a minor one,
usually punishable by a small fine. As a result of the decision, one of
the equally guilty parties is in effect fined, in addition to the criminal
penalty, an amount equal to the value of the cows, and, what is worse
from the layman's point of view, the other law-breaker is allowed to
profit to that extent at the expense of his fellow law-breaker. This is
of course true of the illegality cases generally, the only difference being that in some of them the acts if done constitute more serious crimes.6
The layman's astonishment increases when he is told that the result
would be the same if the chattel were worth $1,000, or if land were
sold (conveyance made and possession delivered) in return for a promise to pay $5,000 later: the purchaser could keep the property without
paying for it.6 How, he -will ask, can so extraordinary a result be defended? As we all know, the answer of the lawyer will be that in so
far as the Sunday bargain is "executed," the "law will leave the parties
'There is strangely little criticism on the part of the legal profession generally
of a rule which, the present writer has found, almost universally provokes vigorous criticism from laymen. The most outspoken criticism by a legal writer is
that expressed by Professor Wigmore:
"But the whole notion is radically wrong in principle and produces extreme injustice. If A. owes B. $5,000, why should he not pay it, whether B. has violated
a statute or not? Where the issue is as to the rights of two litigants, it is unscientific to impose a penalty incidentally by depriving one of the litigants of
his admitted right. It is unjust, also, for two reasons: First, one guilty party
suffers, while another of equal guilt is rewarded; secondly, the penalty is usually
utterly disproportionate to the offense. If there is one part of criminal jurisprudence which needs even more careful attention than it now receives, it is the
apportionment of penalty to offense. Yet the doctrine now under consideration
requires, with monstrous injustice and blind haphazard, that the plaintiff shall
be mulcted in the amount of his right, whatever that may be. Take for example,
the case of Cambuioso v. Maffet, 2 Wash. C. C. 98, Fed. Cas. No. 2,330, in which
plaintiff and defendant were joint owners of a vessel. To avoid paying the tax
on alien owners the vessel was registered in the name of the defendant. For
this illegality the plaintiff is denied the help of the courts in making the defendant
account for the vessel's profits. In this way, and in a hundred similar ways, a fine
of thousands of dollars may be imposed for petty violations of the law. One cannot imagine why we have so long allowed such an unworthy principle to remain."
John H. Wigmore, discussing the general doctrine under consideration, in Note
(1891) 25 Am. L. REv., 712.
6

See illustrations 1 and 2 from the

low p. 169.

RESTATEMENT,

reprinted in the text be-
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where their illegal transaction left them. ' 7 The following passage from
the opinion of Smith, J., in Thompson v. Williams,8 is typical:
"The defendant is not estopped by the judgment in the trespass suit from setting up the Sunday law as a defense. The maxim,
'in pari delicto,' etc., was not established for the benefit of one party
or of the other. The law does not leave the weaker at the mercy of
the stronger, nor give the vendor a remedy by allowing him to retake the property illegally sold. It leaves the parties where their
illegal contractleft them; when executed, it will not assist the party
who has parted with his money or property to recover it back;
when executory, it will not compel performance. It would not
leave the parties where their illegal contract left them, if it did
not maintain the title acquired by the contract. Williams was in
possession of the cows, as of his own property, by the assent of
Thompson. When the latter retook them, Williams was enabled
to maintain trespass, because Thompson could not be heard to
controvert his title."
After quoting this passage with approval, Keener in his well
known work on Quasi-Contracts accounts for the result as follows:
"Probably no better illustration can be found in our law of
the importance of distinguishing between a right in rem and a right
in personam than is afforded by the case of Thompson v. WilHams. The plaintiff in the action of trespass succeeded because,
having acquired a title by the purchase of property, the source of
his title was immaterial. The vendor, by interfering with the
posses.sion of the vendee, to whom the title had passed, was a tortfeasor, as any stranger would have been in similar circumstances.
But when the vendor sought to recover in assumpsit against the
vendee for the value of the property sold, he was seeking the aid
of the court to reduce a chose in action into possession, and to acquire as a result of such reduction a right in rem." 9
Apparently this reasoning seems quite conclusive both to judges
and to theoretical writers like Keener; the result seems to be thought of
as more or less inevitable, especially if one keeps in mind the essential
nature of rights in ren as distinguished from rights in personam. As
already indicated, the great majority of American courts that have
passed upon the question have agreed in reaching this result. It has
now received the approval of the learned Reporter who has prepared the
"Leave both parties as it finds them" is the phrase in the

858 N. H. 248, 249 (1878).
9
KEENER, QUASI CoNcACrs (1893)

271, n. 1.

RESTATEMENT,

p. 1040.
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Restatement of the Law of Contracts recently published by the American Law Institute. Without any discussion of their relative merits the
minority view-for there is a minority view-has been rejected, and
the majority view recommended as preferable.1 0 Presumably Professor
Williston and his able advisers would defend this choice on the simple
ground that where the authorities are overwhelmingly on one side the
Institute is bound to state the law that way." Be this as it may, the
acceptance of the majority view by the Institute without comment or
dissent by the learned Reporter or his advisers, or indeed by any member of the Institute when the section in question was presented at the
annual meeting, seems worthy of comment. If, as the present writer
believes, the reasoning upon which the majority view is based will not
withstand critical analysis, and if that view is indefensible from a social
point of view, it would be unfortunate if the Restatement were to be
adopted blindly by courts in states in which the question may be an
open one. Precisely that is likely to happen if the Restatement, backed
as it is by the quasi-official prestige of the Institute, has the influence
in bringing about the uniformity of decision which its sponsors hope for.
The matter is thus of some practical importance at this time. The present writer has long been convinced that the supposedly logical and convincing reasoning used to support the majority view is, when closely
examined, not at all conclusive. Indeed, it is based upon both the careless use of ambiguous language and a failure to analyze carefully certain
fundamental legal concepts. It is, therefore, proposed in the present
paper to undertake a reExamination of the matter. This is done in the
hope that if it can be shown that the minority view is at least equally
"logical," the way will be opened for a more careful discussion of the
whole matter of the effects of illegal contracts from the point of view
of the social utility of the results reached under the prevailing and the
minority view. Another and perhaps more important purpose of the
present paper is to call renewed attention to the need for a critical reexamination of some of our fundamental legal conceptions, 12 a need
which has in more recent days been somewhat lost sight of in the controversies aroused by the call for a more "realistic" jurisprudence.' 8
"' See the text of RESTATEMENT, §538, reprinted below.
' But see the action of the Institute in connection with one section of the RESTATEMENT OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE: PRFCEE-

INGS (1931) Vol. IX, pp. 144-153.
' The assumption made in 1 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, 221,

that the so-called "Hohfeld analysis" is "less suited to the case law system in
America than it might have been to the civil law system on the continent" seems
to the present writer quite erroneous. After using it for over twenty years, the
present writer still finds the analysis indispensable in the analysis of concrete
legal problems such as those dealt with in the present paper.
'The present writer confesses to a dislike for the adjective "realistic", at
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It will perhaps be well before proceeding further to state the substance of the two opposing views. Probably the best summary of the
majority view is that given in the Restatement, as follows:
§538.

WHAT BARGAINS MADE OR TO BE PERFORMED ON SUNDAY ARE

ILLEGAL.

(1) A bargain, except mutual promises to marry, that is not one
of necessity or charity, is illegal if made or, except as stated in Subsection (2), to be performed wholly or in part on Sunday. Promises in such
an illegal bargain impose no duty, but a conveyance that would have
been effective if made on a secular day is effective even though made on
Sunday if the subject matter of the conveyance is delivered or otherwise
reduced to possession with the consent of the grantor; and though there
is no delivery or reduction to possession, such a conveyance gives a
power to the grantee to make an effective conveyance to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice that the prior conveyance was made on
Sunday.
(2) When in a contract made on a secular day the day fixed for
performance falls on Sunday, and performance on that day is not material to the object of the contract, it is interpreted as requiring performance on the next secular day that is not a holiday, and as so interpreted
is not illegal.'
The following illustrations are given showing the application of
the text to concrete cases:
A conveys and delivers possession of Blackacre to B on Sunday, B
promising to pay $5,000 therefor. The bargain is illegal and A cannot
recover the price. If possession had not been delivered, B could not
compel A to surrender it. If, however, the conveyance did not show
on its face that it was made on Sunday, B would have a power to transfer complete ownership to a bona fide purchaser for value.
On Sunday A agrees to sell and B agrees to buy an automobile
which is delivered 'by A to B on that day. B at the same time promises
to pay $1,000. The bargain is illegal, and B is under no duty to pay the
price. A cannot recover the automobile. If the automobile had not been
delivered, B could not enforce a right to it even though there has been
assent to an immediate transfer of ownership.
On Sunday A agrees to sell and B agrees to buy an automobile, and
on the same day B pays the agreed price. A does not deliver the automobile. B cannot recover it even though there has been assent to an immediate transfer of ownership. Nor can he recover the money paid.
A agrees with B to render services every day during the ensuing
month, including Sundays. Performance on Sunday of such services is
least as applied to his own attitude, which he likes to think of as nothing more
than an attempt to bring to bear on the study of legal phenomena what may for
want of a better term be called the scientific point of view.
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not work of necessity or charity. B promises to pay a lump sum for all
the services. A renders the agreed services. The bargain is illegal and
A has no right to payment for any portion of the services rendered.
A sells and delivers a horse to B on Sunday, and on A's demand,
made on Monday, B refuses to surrender it. A cannot recover the horse
or the agreed price for it or its fair value. 1
The view taken by the minority may best be shown by noting the
case of Winfield v. Dodge,16 in which the parties had traded horses on
Sunday. The plaintiff became dissatisfied and tried to persuade the
defendant to trade back, offering to return the horse he had received
from the defendant. The defendant having refused, the plaintiff
brought replevin for the horse he had delivered to the defendant. The
judgment of the lower court denying recovery was reversed by the Michigan Supreme Court. Graves, J., speaking for the court said:
"The transaction on Sunday passed no title. As a trade it was
void . . . the plaintiff was entitled to reclaim his horse against the void
17
negotiation."
In a state which follows this doctrine the litigation between the
parties which ended in the decision in Thompson v. Williams,18 discussed above, would of course have terminated differently. When the
seller in that case by peaceful means recaptured the two cows, he would
have been doing nothing wrongful, and the other party would have failed
in the trespass action.
Now that we have the essential features of the two opposing doctrines in mind, we are in a position to examine into their merits, both
from the point of view of "logic" and that of social utility. We begin
with the logical aspect of the matter.
The usual statement is that the fundamental principle involved is
that in the case of "illegal" bargains "the law leaves both parties as it
finds them"'1 9 except where they are not in pari delicto or there are other
countervailing considerations of public policy. 20 Starting with this preRESTATFMENT, Vol. II, §538.
RESTATEmENT, Vol. II, pp. 1042-1043.

"45 Mich. 355, 7 N. W. 906 (1881).
"The court here uses the word "void." Professor Williston very properly
points out that if this language is accurate, a valid transfer by the purchaser (before possession is retaken by the seller) to a bona fide purchaser for value could
not be made. 3 WLLISTON, CoNmAcrs (1920) 2986. At a later point in the present
discussion it is shown that the concrete decisions made under the minority view can
stand and yet a bona fide purchaser for value be protected. See below, pp. 180-192.
"58 N. H. 248 (1878).
"This is the language in the RESTATEMENT, in the Special Note, p. 1040.
In Thompson v. Williams, 58 N. H. 248 (1878), the language was: "It [the law]
leaves the parties where their illegal contract left them. . . . It would not leave
the parties where their illegal contract left them if it did not maintain the title
acquired by the contract."
For the exceptions to the general doctrine as to illegal contracts, see WOODWARD, QUAsi-CoNTRACTs (1913), §136, and RESTATEMENT, §§599-605.
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mise, courts as well as writers like Keener and Williston go on to argue
in substance, that where the chattel has been delivered by the seller on
2
Sunday with intent to pass title, the buyer has acquired both "title" '
and "possession," including a right against the seller to a "continuance
of his possession," 22 and that the law will not undo these results. Thus
Keener says: "the plaintiff [in Thompson v. Williams, supra] having acquired a title [right in rem] by the [Sunday] purchase of the property,
'23
the source of his title was immaterial.
Keener's only "proof" of the validity of this statement is the assertion that it grows out of the nature of a right in rem as distinguished
from a right in persona. 2 4 Williston seems to argue that unless it is
recognized that the "title" passes to the buyer, bona fide purchasers for
value from him cannot be protected. 2 5 Both of these propositions deserve critical examination.
The first thing which needs our attention is that the statement that
"the law leaves the parties as it finds them" is ambiguous and susceptible
of more than one meaning. It may mean: (1) the law will do nothing
to alter the physical situation which the parties have brought about by
their own acts without the aid of the law; or (2) it will not alter either
the physical or the legal situationresulting from the acts of the parties.
A moment's consideration will disclose that it is the latter meaning which
writers like Keener and Williston, as well as courts, actually give to the
principle in question. 26 In doing so they pass over without discussion
the important and obvious fact that this legal situation ("title" and
"possession" are now vested in the buyer) is not a result which the
parties can produce without the cSoperation of the law. The misleading
character of the argument appears when we notice that at the outset we
apparently start with two violators of the Sabbath law who have by
their own acts, unaided by the law brought about certain results, created a certain situation: "the law will leave the parties as it finds them,"
since both are lawbreakers; neither can call on the law to aid him to
undo the results, to alter the situation in question. To account for the
results reached by the courts, however, it becomes necessary to interpret
the terms "results" and "situation" to include the legal results, the legal
' Professor Williston frequently uses the term "property" in speaking of
sales of chattels. This is discussed below.
' This "right to a continuance in possession" is of course not a separate and
independent right, but merely one incident of "title" or "ownership"
' KEENER, 10c. cit. supra note 9.
' KEENER, loc. cit. supra note 9.
' WILLISTON, loc. cit. mupra note 10.
Williston's argument is not entirely
clear at this point, his statement being that if the bargain is "absolutely void,"
a bona fide purchaser for value would not be protected. But, if the present writer
does not mistake his mneaning, the statement in the text is a fair interpretation
of his argument as a whole, as will be more specifically indicated later.
I See the language of Smith, J., in Thompson v. Williams, 58 N. H. 248 (1878),
quoted above in note 19.
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situation, and we are accordingly told that "title" and "possession"
have vested in the buyer, so that the transaction is now "executed."
Attention is diverted from the plain fact that under the prevailing view
it has been decided for some reason or other and without adequate discussion that to the illegal acts of the seller, done on Sunday, the law has
attached the legal consequences which it is now refusing to undo.
aAt the risk of perhaps unnecessary repetition, let us restate the
matter as follows: It cannot be denied that without the aid of the law
certain physical events have been brought to pass by the parties, so that
as a result of their own voluntary but illegal acts their physical relations
to the chattel have been changed-formerly it was in the physical custody or control of the seller; now it is in that of the buyer. Is it this
physical situation to which reference is made when it is stated that "the
law will leave the parties as it finds them" ? The form of the statement
seems so to suggest, for it speaks as if the law 'had as yet had nothing to
do with the creation of the situation in which it "finds" the parties and
which it refuses to change. But if we are to reach the results of the
prevailing view it will not do to confine the term "situation" to the
physical situation: mere physical custody or control acquired with the
assent of the owner does not of necessity confer the rights which ac'27
company either "title" or "possession.
The situation, then, which the law refuses to alter, in which it is
claimed it "finds" the parties, is one which the law itself has created
by attaching to the unlawful acts the legal consequences in question:
title and possession have passed to the buyer. 28 It thus becomes clear
that if we are to justify the prevailing doctrines we must examine into
the reasons which seem to be given for attaching these legal consequences
to the unlawful sale and delivery on Sunday. Why should the law do
this on behalf of th~e buyer, and yet refuse on behalf of the seller to
attach the legal consequence of enforceability to the unlawful act of the
buyer in promising to pay?
Unfortunately there is but little explicit discussion of the matter;
courts and writers usually assume without discussion that title and possession must, or at least did, accompany the seller's delivery of physical
custody with intent to pass title to the buyer. As already stated, there
It is hardly necessary to give examples; the most obvious case of physical
custody without either "possession" or "title" is that of a servant. Of more importance for the present discussion are cases in which "possession but no title"
or "right to continue in possession" accompanies physical custody, as in the case
of a bailee at will, or an agent given possession of a chattel with a revocable authority to sell. Both of these have "possession," but neither "title" nor "right to
continue in possession" as against the bailor or principal.
I Professor Williston is entirely clear on the point that it must first be held
that title has passed and possession acquired if the results of the prevailing view
are to be reached: See, 2 RESTATEMENT, p. 1040, Special Note.
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seem to be two chief reasons given, one offered by Keener, the other by
29
Williston.
Keener's theory is that the difference between the two cases-delivery on the one hand and promise to pay on the other-grows out
of the nature of rights in rem as distinguished from rights in personam.
Just what there is about the nature of a right in rem which makes the
result in question inevitable or "logical" is nowhere explicitly stated.
We must therefore examine into this supposedly fundamental distinction
between rights in rem and those in personam.30 The present writer has
on more than one occasion dealt with the possible meanings and ambiguities of these mysterious Latin labels, in rem and in personam,3 '
'but never primarily with reference to their use in the classification of
Tights. At the outset one is tempted to quote Bertrand Russell's remark
to the effect that "if there is one thing more than another that a long
life has taught me, it is that Latin tags always express falsehoods."32 Be
this as it may, there seems small doubt that these particular Latin terms
have done little to promote clarity of thought. Indeed, we would probably be justified in saying that more often than not they are used to conceal careless analysis and loose thinking.3 3 If the present writer is not
mistaken, that is the case in the matters now under discussion.
Many writers have pointed out that the phrase in rem is peculiarly
misleading as used in the classification of rights. The first difficulty is
that it tends to obscure the plain fact that all rights are against persons,
even though they may relate to things.3 4 A second is that the use of the
singular, "right in ren" rather than the plural, "rights in rem," conceals the complexity of the concept involved and of the legal phenomena
to which that concept is supposed to apply. This second difficulty becomes of the greatest importance in determining what may be said to
happen when a so-called "right in rem" i§ "transferred," as the discussion will attempt to show.
' Supra, p. 167.
' "The ideas which underlie relations it rein (unpolarized relations) and retions in personain (polarized relations) constitute one of the most pervasive, fundamental and utilitarian categories of juristic science. Without them we should be
in the paleolithic age of jurisprudence." Kocourek, Polarized and Unpolarized
Legal Relations (1921), 9 Ky. L. J. 131.
' See the present writer's papers on The Powers of Courts of Equity (1915),
15 COL. L. REv. 37, 106, 228; and The Jurisdiction of Sovereign States and the
Conflict of Laws (1931) 31 CoL. L. REv., 368, 381.
1 PHILosoPHY (1929) 101.
'See tb e papers by the present writer referred to in note 31 above, and
Hohfeld's paper Fundamental Legal Conceptions, II, first printed in (1917)
26 YALE L. 1.,
710, and reprinted in FuNDAmENTAL LEGAL CoNCEPTIONS AND OTER
EssAys (1923) 65.
' See the discussion by Wesley N. Hohfeld in Fundamental Legal Conceptiots,
II (1917), 26 YALE L. J., 710, 720, reprinted in FuNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS
(1923) 65, 74.
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It will not be necessary or helpful to repeat here even the substance
of the many discussions of this so-called fundamental classification of
rights into those in rem and those in personam. Some writers have emphasized "indeterminate incidence" as the important thing about rights
in rem. Others dwell upon the number of persons against whom such a
"right" is available.3 5 For our present purposes two things may be emphasized. The first, clearly enunciated by Hohfeld in his writings, is
the complex character of a so-called right in rem.30 To use a somewhat
crude figure of speech, we might say that a right in rem is a complex
legal "molecule" whose constituent "atoms" are an indefinite number of
claims (rights in the strict sense), privileges, powers, and immunities.3 7
If we examine carefully the normal case of an owner of land or of a
chattel, we find in the first place that the owner has rights (in the narrow sense, i.e., enforceable claims) against A, against B, against C-or,
as we say, against all the world 38 that each one of them refrain from
dealing with the physical object in certain ways defined more or less
clearly in the law of property and torts. Corresponding to these rights
(claims) of the owner are the duties of each of these other persons to
refrain from the specified conduct.8 9 In addition the owner has an
equally indefinite number of privileges ("liberties"),40 powers, 41 and
immunities. 42 Each one of these claims, privileges, powers, and immunities is a separate and distinct legal relation and may be separately
43
extinguished.
A second important characteristic of "a right in rem," one which is
usually overlooked or at least not emphasized, is that the number of
legal relations composing the "molecule" is constantly changing: as peoHohfeld, op. cit. supra note 34, p. 91.
Hohfeld, op. cit. supra note 34, p. 91; Cook, Jurisdiction of Sovereign States
and the Conflict of Laws (1931) 31 COL. L. REv. 368.
' Hohfeld, op. cit. supra note 34, p. 91.
'This is frequently too broad, as individual persons may have privileges to
enter under easements, licenses, and the like.
"Though referred to by Hohfeld as "correlatives" right and duty are not
separate legal relations. The two words denote a single relation, the right-duty
relation, which may 'be viewed first from the point of view of one party, and then
from that of the other. Cf. Radin, Correlation (1929) 29 CoL. L. REV. 901. The
discussion in the text is confined to rights in rem which relate to physical objects
which can be "owned."
"For a discussion of the meaning of the privilege-"no-right" relation, see
Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (1913)
'

23 YALE L. J. 16, 32, reprinted in FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEMrONS (1923)

38.

23,

, For a discussion of the power-liability relation, see the paper by Hohfeld referred to in the preceding note at p. 44, in the reprint at p. 50.
' For a discussion .of the immunity-disability relation, see the paper by Hohfeld
referred to in note 40, at p. 55, in the reprint at p. 60.
43E.g., if a landowner grants an easement of way to a neighboring landowner,
he thereby extinguishes the claim-duty relationship between himself and the
neighbor.
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ple die, or become old enough to be legally responsible in tort for injuries
to the object in question, etc., claim-duty relationships come to an end
or come into existence, as the case may be.44 Perhaps a better comparison would therefore be to a river, which we usually think of as the
same river even though every moment its actual composition is changing:
springs feed it, some of the water flows into the sea, evaporates, or
otherwise disappears, etc. In the case of a right in rem there is, so
to speak, a constant "flow" of claims, privileges, powers and immunities,
but as they relate to the same physical object we ordinarily think of
45
"the right in rem" as unchanged.
Keeping this analysis in mind, let us attempt to answer the question:
What happens when "a right in remn" ("title" or "ownership") is
"transferred"? Obviously our tendency is to think of the "title" or
"the right in ren" as a sort of existing thing or entity which "passes"
or "is transferred" along with the physical object "owned." Consequently we tend to assume that, since "the title" already "exists," ready
to be "transferred," all that happens is that the seller without the aid
of the law "transfers" it to the buyer. Thinking of it in this way we
also tend to assume that in the process of "transfer" the law does not
"create" new rights or "destroy" (divest) old ones. All of which is
entirely as it should be if we realize-and this is the crux of the matter-that in speaking this way we are using figurative language, a kind
of verbal shorthand, useful enough if not taken literally or as expressing
the whole truth. Unfortunately all figures of speech are likely to mislead when taken literally, and all shorthand is open to misinterpretation.
If we note the figurative character of our language and expand our shorthand we shall be able to free ourselves from the misleading implications
of our every-day way of talking.4 6
It will be well to make the matter a bit more concrete, or at least less
abstract, by confining our attention for the time being to the transfer
of "title" to a chattel 4 7 by means of an' ordinary sale and delivery, using
S to denote the seller and B the buyer. Before the sale-in terms of
"A similar statement may be made as to the number of legal privileges, powers.
and immunities.
' What is true of a river is also true though to a lesser degree of any so-callel
"object," whether it be a glass of water or Cleopatra's Needle: See BlDGMAN,
THE: LOGIC OF MODEM

PHYsics (1927)

35: "an object with identity is an ab-

straction corresponding to nothing in nature"; WHITEHEAD, THE CONCEIPT OF NATURE (1926), 166. Compare the discussion of the meaning of "Julius Caesar" in
WHITEHEAD, SYMBOLISM: ITS MEANING AND EFFECT

(1927) 27.

' It is of course unnecessary to be more precise in our analysis of a given concept or bit of shorthand than the nature of our problem demands. Fortunately
the ambiguities of our language do not involve us in difficulties most of the time.
Compare RITCHIE ScrENTFIc METHOD? (1923) 33.
1 "Chattel" here means a movable physical object, as distinguished from immovable objects, "land."
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the analysis above outlined-S has as against B a claim that B refrain
from taking or injuring the chattel, etc., or, to put the same thing from
B's point of view, B is under a duty to refrain from those acts of interference with the chattel. There are an indefinite number of similar
claim-duty relationships between S and other persons, C, D, E, etc.:
"all the world" as we say. Each one of these claim-duty relationships
is a separate and distinct relationship, and may be extinguished by S
without affecting the others, e.g., S can give B permission to take the
chattel; the effect is to extinguish, for the time being at least, B's duty.
The duties owed S by C, D, E, etc., remain.
As a part of his "right in rem" S has, inter alia, also the legal power
(legal ability) by doing certain physical acts to "transfer the title" to B,
or to C, etc. Once more expanding our shorthand, we find that
what happens in this so-called "transfer of title," is that the law attaches to these "acts of transfer" the legal consequences, among others,
that the indefinite number of claim-duty relationships existing between
S and B, S and C, S and D, etc., are now extinguished or "divested,"
and-what is of more importance for present purposes-a similar, also
indefinite, number of new claim-duty relationships are created by the
48
law in favor of B as against S, C, D, E, etc.
If this analysis 4 9 is accepted, it appears clear that when we speak
with accuracy we are not entitled to say that an "existing right in rem"
-has merely 'been "transferred" to B. What we should say is that S's
rights in rem have been destroyed or "divested," and new and similar
rights in rem created by the law on behalf of B. As will be pointed out
more in detail later, B's new "rights in remz" may or may not be substantially similar to those which S formerly had; in some cases they are
more extensive in scope, and in others less.50 It should be emphasized
that even when the new "right" is substantially similar in scope to the
old, it ought not in any accurate sense to be regarded as the "same"
right which has merely "passed" from one person to another.r'
'Or, stating it the other way around, a similar and indefinite number of new
duties toward B have been imposed by the law upon S, C, D, etc.
" The analysis in the text, while sufficient for present purposes, is incomplete,
as it does not deal with the divesting of S's privileges against B of using, destroying, etc., the object, and the investing of B as against S with similar privileges; or with the power and immunity aspects of the "molecule."
0 Where an owner in fee simple of land conveys it to A for life, remainder to
B for life, remainder to C in fee, three new legal "molecules," i.e., complex aggregates of legal relationships, are created, no one of which is coextensive with the
"fee simple."
1 Professor Beale in his fragmentary TREATISE ON CONFLICr OF LAws (1916),
§139 et seq. distinguishes between what he calls a "static right" and the dynamic
rights which protect the static right. He regards the title to property as a static
right, which exists and is transferred from one person to another. Space is
lacking in which to analyze this conception. It has been briefly discussed' by
Hohfeld, in the paper referred to in note 33 above at p. 725, in the reprint at p. 78.
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Coming now to the case of the sale and delivery on Sunday: it happens that B, the buyer, is, equally with the seller, a violator of the Sunday law. Is it not pertinent to ask, how comes it that the law which
refuses to create on behalf of S a single enforceable claim (a right
[claim] in personam) against B, because it is unwilling to aid a lawbreaker, nevertheless is willing to create on behalf of B, also a lawbreaker, not only a valid claim against 5, thereby imposing on the latter a duty to B to refrain from taking the chattel, but also a vast and indefinite number of other claims against C, D, E, etc?52 Must we not
conclude that the law is straining at a gnat and swallowing a camel?
To sum up the argument to this point: we have seen that the "title"
cannot "pass" to B by means of the acts of the parties alone. If title
passes, it must be because the law steps in and not only divests S's "right
inrem" (complex aggregate of claims, privileges, powers, and immunities) but also creates on behalf of B, the other law-breaker, a similar
"right" (complex aggregate of legal relations). The law therefore first
creates the situation in which it "finds" the parties and which it refuses
to alter. To do this is inconsistent with the theory that the law will not
come to the aid of either of the law-breakers. Careful analysis thus
reveals that there is nothing about the nature of a right in rem which
leads to the prevailing doctrine; quite the opposite is the case. The
reason offered by Keener is therefore seen to be entirely inadquate to
support his conclusion.
This brings us to the other idea which seems to underlie the arguments of some writers, to the effect that since bona fide purchasers for
value from the Sunday buyer acquire a title free from claims by the
seller or persons claiming under him, it must be that the buyer himself
had title. This amounts to saying that unless it is recognized that title
passes to the buyer, it will be impossible to protect the bona fide purchaser. 53 The issue thus raised is a fundamental one and requires for
its solution much careful analysis. Interestingly enough, it turns out
upon examination to be connected with the classification of "Tights" into
To the present writer it seems based in part upon what is commonly calledl the
"hypostatization" of an abstraction, and in part upon a confusion between factual
interest and its legal protection.
'Also an indefinite number of privileges, powers, and immunities.
IIt is difficult to find this argument explicitly stated in clear language in connection with the Sunday law cases. It seems to underlie Professor Williston's
argument in §1702 of his work on Contracts and §666 of that on Sales. As pointed
out below, it becomes explicit in his discussion of the cases in which goods are
obtained by fraud (See §1370 of his CoNTRAcrs and §567 of his SAIES), especially when that discussion is read in connection with, e.g., §311 of his work on
Sales, quoted from below, p. 183, and which opens with the sentence: "It is a
fundamental doctrine of the law of property that no one can give what he has not."
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those in rem and those in personam. It begins apparently by assuming
that title, being a right in rem, is a sort of indivisible whole. If one has
it, he can pass it on; if not, he cannot.54 If it does pass, it may nevertheless be that in some cases-e.g., where a transfer is induced by fraud
-there is an "equity" or "equitable right" to a "rescission," i.e., a "reconveyance" of the "title." This "equity," the argument seems to run,
is a mere right in personam, and so is "cut off" if the holder of the
"title" transfers it to a bona fide purchaser for value.5
In the case of
land, we are told, this is clear: the execution and delivery of the deed
pass the "title"; the grantee is "owner"; the grantor's only right, if he
has any, is a claim (right in personam) enforceable only in equity; what
he "owns" is not the land but the "obligation" of the "constructive
trustee." 5 6 The holders of this theory are however compelled to recognize that in the case of chattels an action at law is allowed the transferor
by means of which in a proper case-e.g., where goods are obtained by
fraud-he can "rescind" the "transfer" and so (they tell us) "regain"
the "title" and possession. This they explain as an anomaly in procedure only: the action at law takes the place of a bill in equity. In
"' "One who has a title, which in his hands is voidable or subject to a right of
rescission by another, may transfer a title to a purchaser for value without notice,
free from the possibility of avoidance or rescission; but one who has no title
at all can transfer none, and that a buyer from him pays value in good faith
without notice makes no difference." WILISTON, SALES (1924) §311. And in the
note the learned author quotes from the opinion in Saltus v. Everett, 20, Wend.
267, 32 Am. Dec. 541 (N. Y. 1838), in which the maxim that "no one can transfer
a better title than he himself has" is treated as a correct statement of the law.
To be noted is that this treatment of "title" is entirely compatible with recognizing that there may be more than one type of "title!' or "ownership," such as
"full ownership," "bare legal title," "title by way of security," etc. As to this, see
below, p. 187.
"I take pleasure in believing that for centuries, not only has it been characteristic of the rights enforced by equity that they are directed primarily against
one person [i.e., are rights in personam], and secondarily against those who stand
in no better position (that is, donees or purchasers with notice); but that this
way of working out most of the legal problems with which equity has to deal
is valuable and should not be given up. If this is true, it follows as a natural
and necessary consequence of the essential characteristics of personal rights [rights
in personam], that a right which is valid against one person or set of persons [i.e.,
a "personal" right or right in personam] is ineffective when title to the property
gets into the hands of another person." Williston, The Word "Equitable" and
Its Application to Assignment of Choses in Action (1918) 31 HAR. L. REv., 822.
"A cestui que trust is frequently spoken of as an equitable owner of the land.
This, though a convenient form of expression, is clearly inaccurate. The trustee
is the owner of the land, and of course, two persons with adverse interests cannot
be owners of the same thing. What the cestui que trust really owns is the obligation of the trustee; for an obligation is as truly the subject matter of property
as any physical res. . . . The owner of a house or a horse enjoys the fruits of
ownership without the aid of any other person. The only way in which the owner
of an obligation can realize his ownership is by compelling performance by the
obligor. Hence, in the one case, the owner is said to have a right in rei, and in
the other, a right in personam." Ames, Purchase for Value Without Notice (1887)
1 HARV. L. R-v. 1, 9.
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spite of this, we are told, the "title" is in the "transferee" until "re57
scission."
According to this theory, then, bona fide purchasers for value are
protected only when they have accepted a transfer from one who had
"title"; since bona fide purchasers for value from Sunday buyers are
protected, it must follow that these buyers acquired "title" under the
Sunday "conveyances." The first thing to be noted is that this theory
proves too much: since by hypothesis title has passed to the Sunday
buyer, and the seller (as he is a law-breaker) has no "equity" or "equitable right" (right in personam) to rescission, either at law or in equity,
it is difficult to see why it does not logically follow, that any transferee
58
of the buyer is protected, whether a bona fide purchaser or not.
The theory in question, however, suffers from more fundamental
infirmities. In the first place, it ignores the complex character of a socalled right in rem or "title," and so fails to recognize adequately that
in many cases it is of small utility, if any, to say that "title" or "ownership" is vested in one or the other of two competing parties. 59 In the
second place, it relies in the last analysis upon that inadequate theory of
the relations of common law and equity current in the last generation
which apparently had its origin in the erroneous doctrine that since
equity acts only in personam all equitable Tights are necessarily in perso.am. 6o
1 "The typical case of protection of an innocent purchaser is the case where
the defendant has bought a legal title from a fraudulent trustee or vendee. (Pilcher v. Rawlins, 7 Ch. 259). No distinction is to be made between the purchaser
In truth the fraudulent vendee who
of land and the purchaser of a chattel ....
gets the title to a chattel is a constructive trustee, and the action of trover against
him presents the anomaly of a bill in equity in a court of common law." Ames,
Purchaserfpr Value without Notice (1887), 1 HAw. L. Rv., 1, 4. Dean Ames
then goes on to discuss legal property rights as being in remn and fundamentally
different from the right in personan of the cestui que trust, and speaks of "the
purchaser of a title who holds it subject to an equity."
" In Horton v. Buffington, 105 Mass. 399 (1870) a wagon sold and delivered
on Sunday was attached by the defendant, a deputy sheriff, on a writ against the
seller, the wagon having in the meantime been sold and delivered to the plaintiff.
The trial judge told the jury that if the plaintiff was a bona fide purchaser for
value, he acquired a title good as against the attaching creditor of the original
seller. Verdict was for the plaintiff. In affirming judgment for the plaintiff the
appellate court argued as follows: "It is difficult to see how the original vendor
could have reclaimed it [the wagon] on the ground of an illegality in the conThis
tract of sale. The law would not aid him to undo what he had done ....
disability on his part to reclaim it would avail the party holding it, as a sufficient
title. It had ceased to be the original vendor's property, or liable for his debts,
and therefore the attachment under which the defendant seeks to justify was
wrongful." Note that this argument would protect a donee or -mala fide purchaser
as well as a bona fide purchaser. Indeed, there is no reference in the opinion to
the fact that the plaintiff was a bona fide purchaser.
'As pointed out below, Professor Williston himself has in his writings recognized that there may be a "divided ownership." See p. 187 below.
0 See the quotations from Dean Ames and Professor Williston in notes 54, 55,
56 and 57 above. The matter is discussed in the present writer's articles upon The
Powers of Courts of Equity (1915) 15 CoL. L. Rxv., 37, 106, and 228.
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The concept of tile as a sort of indivisible whole, which a person
must "have" if he is to "transfer" it, though it may be subject to an
"equity," leads some writers who hold the theory to somewhat startling
conclusions. Thus Professor Chafee argues that the thief of a negotiable instrument payable to bearer or indorsed in blank has "title," and
that this is the reason why bona fide purchasers for value from him are
protected. He writes:
"The legal title to a negotiable instrument throughout its
existence belongs to the person to whom the promises run by the
the instrument if he has possession, no matter how that possession
terms of the instrument if he has possession, no matter how that
possession came to him.
"This proposition is extremely important for our problem because if it be sound, the fact that a bona fide purchaser after maturity takes from a wrongdoer, even a defrauder or a thief, will
be immaterial to deprive him of protection. He has legal title,
and where equities are equal the legal title prevails. On the other
hand, if possession by one within the description of the instrument does not always involve legal title, it will be necessary to determine the conditions under which possession does or does not
confer legal title upon the bona fide purchaser after maturity.
"The validity of our second main proposition seems plain from
the language of negotiable instruments, but it invariably causes
uneasiness; because if it be true, a thief has legal title. This is
the acid test to which we shall not delay to submit our theory.
"A thief has legal title to a negotiable instrument payable to
bearer or indorsed in blank. It is high time to stop being squeamish about this. Other bad men are admitted to have legal title to
negotiable instruments, and sometimes to chattels as well,-defrauders, absconding trustees, impersonators. Of course the thief
is, like them, subject to the equities of his victim, but like them he
does have legal title.
"It is usually assumed that the victim retains legal title after
the theft. This cannot be, for the instrument is by its terms payable to bearer and no one who is not a bearer can sue upon it in a
court of law. If the thief is bearer but has not legal title, then the
legal title has temporarily ceased to exist, for there is no one else
to whom the promise runs. Lord Holt put the matter clearly in
1699: 'The course of trade.., creates a property in the assignee
or bearer.' The bona fide purchaser. from the thief gets the legal
title because it was first in the victim and then in the thief and then
in the purchaser, passing with the possession. The title did not
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jump over the thief or pass through some mysterious legal subway.
The effect of the bona fide purchase is not to create a fresh legal
title but to cut off the equities of the victim....
"Various attacks have been launched against the legal title
theory. Thus Ewart says, 'Property and possession of bills, as of
aught else, are inseparable; otherwise I could never bring trover
for bills against my book-keeper.' The reply has been explained
already. The plaintiff in trover does not have legal title but recovers on the equitable right to restitution, just like the defrauded
seller of goods, whose interest must be only equitable since it can
be cut off if the fraudulent buyer sells to a bona fide purchaser for
value without notice." 0 1
According to this mode of analysis, it would follow that in England
where the doctrine of sale in market overt is recognized, a thief who
steals a chattel has "title," since he can give an indefeasible title to a
bona fide purchaser for value.0 2 The way to test the accuracy-perhaps a better word would be utility-of this analysis is to take note
of the decisions, i.e., to find out just what claims, privileges, etc., the
two parties have with respect to the chattel. On the one hand we find
that before the sale in market overt the dispossessed owner has a claim
to 'be restored to possession, enforceable by replevin or detinue. Moreover, if he can succeed in laying his hands on the chattel he commits no
wrong against the thief by peaceably retaking it; i.e., he has a legal privilege of recapture. 3 Further, the dispossessed owner can follow the
chattel into the hands of third parties, recovering either the chattel itself or its value, except in the one case of. a sale in market overt. On
the other hand, the thief has as against third persons not claiming under
the dispossessed owner all the rights of a possessor, and in addition a
legal power by selling in market overt to give an indefeasible title to a
bona fide purchaser. This legal power, which seems to Professor Chafee
a kind of "mysterious subway" through which the indivisible entity,
"title," is "passed" from the original owner to the transferee of the
thief without passing through the hands of the latter, is obviously given
by the law for reasons of real or supposed' public policy.6 4 Just why
the concept of a legal power to give a good title to an object one does
not "own" or have "title" to should be regarded as mysterious, it is diffiChafee, Rights in Overdue Paper (1918) 31 HARV. L. REv., 1104, 1112 ff.
Subject of course to the limitation that a transfer back to the thief will result in "reviving" the "title" of the original owner.
" That is to say, no action of trespass de bonis asportatiswill lie against him.
There is no intention to discuss here the extent to which he may use force against
the person of the thief in recapturing possession.
" American jurisdictions have disagreed with the policy of the market overt
doctrine, and so rejected it.
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cult to understand. The legal universe, so to speak, is full of similar
powers. The power of a sheriff to sell chattels on execution and give
a good title to the judgment debtor's goods is a most obvious example.
The power of a: court of equity under modern statutes to vest title by
its mere decree without ordering a conveyance by the owner, is another; the power of a common law court in a writ of partition,
is still another; and of course all cases in which an agent to sell and
convey transfers the principal's property which the agent does not own
are other examples. All these and many other situations exemplify the
plain fact that legal power to give complete title 6 to objects one does
not own frequently exists under our legal system.
To be noted is that this description of the phenomena of judicial
decision as they exist is not offered as an explanation of why the thief,
the sheriff, the court of equity, etc., can give good title; it is no more
than a shorthand way of stating that fact. The why must be sought
in the considerations of social and economic policy which have led
courts or legislative bodies, as the case may be, to confer the power in a
given group of cases. In this respect, however, the "power" theory does
not actually differ from the "title" theory of Professor Chafee: he is
able to "deduce" from his "title" theory that the bona fide purchaser for
value from the thief is protected, only because a legal power to "transfer" an indefeasible title to such a purchaser is really included as a
part of the supposedly indivisible legal atom, "title," which is imputed
to the thief. 66
'That is, as large a number of claims, privileges, etc., as our legal system permits to exist.
'Note Professor Chafee's own recognition of this when he says:
"Apart from this empirical quality of the power theory, it is possible that
it is not essentially at variance with the legal title theory. With the disappearance of the division between law and equity, it is probable that the terminology
of legal and equitable titles will gradually disappear, and that in the scientific
property law of the future, the present equitable title will be regarded as the
true ownership of the thing, while the present legal title will be regarded as a
power created by law to deal with the thing and not a property right at all. In
short, all legal titles are only powers. Whether the wrongdoer's dominion over a
negotiable instrument be called legal title or power is perhaps only a matter of
terminology. The vital point upon which I insist is that the limits of his dominion
are not determined solely by the ipse dixit of the law, but by the terms of the instrument. By virtue of those terms this dominion over the instrument, call it
what you will, passes with the possession of the instrument to any person within
its description, after maturity as well as before, regardless of the manner in
which that person obtained his possession. The terms of the instrument prevent
an arbitrary termination of the 'power' at maturity.
"In other words, so long as the advocates of the 'power' theory recognize that
the holder of an overdue negotiable instrument has the same power that a trustee
has of cutting off equitable ownership of the res, I need not stop to quarrel with
them; but it seems to me more logical and less confusing, so long as the present
dual terminology continues in use, to say that both the trustee and the holder
to whom the promise runs have a legal title. It is hard to see why if the law
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Perhaps the difficulties involved in the point of view under discussion can be brought out more clearly by considering a case on which
Professor Williston has expressed his views more clearly than in his
discussion of the Sunday law cases, viz., that in which the buyer of chattels obtains them by fraud. Of this situation Professor Williston writes
as follows:
"If a buyer obtains by fraud the seller's assent to transfer the ownership of goods, there is no doubt that the buyer gains title thereby." 6' 7
The note appended to this passage and citing authorities to support
it reads in part as follows:
"Thus if the buyer resells the goods to a purchaser for value without
notice the latter gets an indefeasible title."6 8
Passages of this kind need of course to be read in the light of the
author's own writings, so that they may be given if possible the meaning
intended by him. It will therefore be well to reproduce at this point
the following passage from the learned author's work on Sales:
"It is a fundamental doctrine of the law of property that no
one can give that which he has not. One who has a title, which in
his hands is voidable or subject to a xight of rescission by another,
nay transfer a title to a purchaser for value without notice, free
from the possibility of avoidance or rescission; but one who has no
title at all can transfernone, and that a buyer from him pays value
in good faith without notice makes no difference. It is usual to
say that bills of exchange and promissory notes form an exception
to this rule in that a thief or finder of such an instrument, if payable to bearer or indorsed in blank, can give a good title to a bona
fide purchaser for value without notice. Whether the better explanation of this doctrine is that an exception is here noted to the
rule that one who has no title can give none, or whether it is more
accurate to say that mere possession of negotiable paper payable to
can give the thief a power without the consent of his victim, it cannot also give
him legal title without consent."
Chafee, Rights in Overdue Paper (1918) 31 HAv.L. REv. 1104, 1117.
1WILLISTON, CoNTRACTs (1920) §1370. In the recent article, Ownership of
Goods Shipped Under a Bill of Lading to Seller's Order (1933) 82 Li. OF PA. L.
Rzv., 1, 4, Professor Williston states that in drafting the Sales Act he used
"property" to "indicate ownership as between buyer and seller," and confined
"titld' to "ownership good also against third parties." In referring to the fraudulent buyer's rights in the same article, the learned author says: "The fraudulent
buyer acquires ownership" (the italics are those of the present writer).
1 3 WiurisToN, CoNTRAcrs (1920) 1370, note 67. The note continues: "So the
seller may 'affirm' the sale and sue for the agreed price--a remedy which proceeds
on the assumption that title is in the buyer." In terms of the analysis here used,
that the seller may affirm and thereby lose all claim to recover the chattel means
no more than that the law recognizes a legal power in the seller to confer on
the buyer an indefeasible "title' to the goods; there is no need for assuming that
this "title" was already vested in the buyer.
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bearer or indorsed in blank carries title with it, as in the case of
money, so that a thief or finder may properly be said to have the
legal title to the instrument, though of course his title can be divested by the true owner, need not here be considered." 0
Of course the learned author recognizes that the defrauded seller
has ample remedies at common law to regain the chattel, but these remedies are treated as "nothing more than specific enforcement [at law]
of the obligation of the fraudulent buyer to return the title wrongfully
acquired 'by him." 70 That is to say, the defrauded seller has a personal
right (right in personam) against the buyer to a "return" of the "title,"
which right, though equitable in nature, may be "specifically enforced"
at law; as it is "equitable," it will be "cut off" if before it is enforced
the buyer transfers the "title" to a bona fide purchaser for value without
notice of the fraud.71
If now the mode of analysis here suggested is adopted, it will be
found first of all that two groups of cases must be distinguished, ziv.,
those in which the defrauded seller has received nothing of value from
the 'buyer, and those in which he has received a consideration which he
must return, or at least' offer to return, as a basis for "rescission." In
the first of these, according to the decisions the seller without doing anything else in the way of "rescission": (1) can recover the goods in
question in replevin or detinue; (2) can recover their value in an action
of trover, treating the original taking as a conversion; (3) may by selfhelp retake possession of the goods ;72 (4) can recover the goods or their
WILLisroN, SALES (1924) §311. The italics are the present writer's. Query:
May a thief or finder of money properly be said to have "title"? Is anything
more involved than that usually money cannot be specifically identified, so that
it cannot be reclaimed, and a legal power of the thief or finder to give an indefeasible title to a bona fide purchaser? Obviously until the latter is done, the
"true owner" can reclaim the money if he can identify it. Of course the thief or
finder has against third persons all the rights of any possessor.
I' WmLrisox, CoNTRAcrs (1920) §1370. The italics are the present writer's.
Note the use of figurative language here, the "title" being referred to as if it
were a specific object, which has been "wrongfully acquired" and must be "returned." Possibly useful shorthand, but also misleading, and certainly not to be
treated as more than highly figurative.
I The following passage shows clearly how the common law remedies of the
defrauded seller are thought of as a substitute for a bill in equity for "specific
enforcement" of the obligation of the fraudulent buyer to restore the "title."
"If the property in question is land and the buyer has fraudulently acquired a
conveyance, the seller must go into equity in order to get a reconveyance, but in
the case of goods he can regain title to what he has parted with . . . without
this procedure." WILLISTON, CoNTRACrS (1920) §1370. And in his recent paper
referred to in note 67, the learned author speaks of the rights of the defrauded
seller to "rescission" as equitable in origin, though now enforceable at law.
See also the discussion in the learned author's work on Sales, §650.
"As to the remedies of the seller including the privilege of recapture, see:
Wheelden v. Lowell, 50 Me. 499 (1862) ; Smith v. Hale, 158 Mass. 178, 33 N. E.
493 (1893) ; In re Eastgate [1905] 1 K. B. 465; WILLISTON, SALEs (1924) §567.
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value from any one into whose hands they may come except a bona fide
purchaser for value. On the other hand, the fraudulent 'buyer has all the
rights that go with possession, plus a legal power to give a good title
to a bona fide purchaser for value. The situation in this simple case,
where the seller received no consideration and so need return nothing,
is thus precisely comparable to that in the case of stolen money or a
stolen negotiable instrument payable to bearer or indorsed in blank. 73
We are now in a position to see how the conclusion is reached
that the thief or finder has "title" in the case of money or negotiable
instruments payable to bearer or indorsed in blank. Assumed first of
all is the theory that the fraudulent buyer of a chattel acquires "title,"
which he is under a personal "obligation to return!'; that this claim of
the seller for restitution of the "title" is merely a right in personm, in
essential nature "equitable," which can be defeated by a transfer of the
"title" to a bona fide purchaser for value. Then it is discovered that
in the case of the thief or finder of the money or negotiable instrument
payable to bearer the remedies of the original owner are identical with
those of the defrauded seller. The conclusion naturally follows that the
finder or thief must also have "title."
This "title" theory obviously derives whatever initial plausibility
it has from the case of the sale of land induced by fraud, where the
seller's remedy is solely in equity. Here the theory which has been
and to some extent still is legal orthodoxy is that in the case of a trust,
express or constructive, but especially in the case of the latter, the
beneficiary is not "owner" of the "trust res"; all he has is a personal
claim against the trustee, the "ownership" being in the latter.7 4 This
type of analysis is still found in judicial opinions: all the beneficiary in
a so-called constructive trust "owns" is the obligation of the trustee
to reconvey. 75 All such theories, as Hohfeld clearly showed 7" and as the
In the more complex situation, in which the seller has received something
of value, the common law cases hold that the seller must "rescind" by tendering
back what he received before he acquires an enforceable claim to recover the
goods. A few of the cases are collected in 3 Coox, CAsas ON EQUITY (2d ed.
1932) pp. 90 et seq. (As to the rule in Equity, see Comment [1927] 36 YALE L. 3.
879). This may be expressed by saying that the defrauded seller has the legal
power by tendering what he received to acquire an enforceable claim for a
return of the goods. There seems no reason why the privilege of recapture
could -not be exercised in some cases without a prior "rescission," e. g., if in
peacefully retaking his goods the seller were to leave in their place the goods
received from the buyer.
" See the extracts from the writings of Dean Ames in notes 56 and 57, above.
MAITLAND, Lscrums ON EQrITY (1920) pp. 16-18, expresses the same view, as
did Dean Stone in Book Review (1912) 12 CoL. L. Rav. 756.
See Melenky v. Melen, 233 N. Y. 19, 134 N. E. 822 (1922).

"' In The Relations between Equity and Law (1913)

reprinted in FUNDAMENTAL La.

CONCSP-IONs (1923),

11 Mica. L. REV., 537,
115.
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present writer has elsewhere pointed out t7 are misdescriptions of the
phenomena of judicial decision, and lose all plausibility if one turns on
them the illumination of a more careful analysis. Here it will be helpful to quote what the present writer said upon another occasion when
criticizing the theory under discussion:
"By mistake of the scrivener ordered to prepare a deed, too
much land is described, and the deed is executed and delivered containing the erroneous description. As we all know, under orthodox rules the so-called 'legal title' to the extra land vests in the
grantee. There is a 'constructive trust,' enforceable in equity.
Langdell, Ames, Maitland, and (if I understood him correctly)
Dean Pound, and now Judge Cardozo, tell us that the grantor has
no 'estate' in the land; he does not 'own' the land; all he 'owns'
is an obligation, a chose in action, %ia., the obligation of the trustee
to reconvey. So far as he has rights against other persons, we are
told that these are rights that these other persons shall refrain
from 'interfering' with the 'obligation' of the trustee. Now the
way to test such a statement is to examine the relevant legal phenomena-the decisions of the courts-and to find out just what
claims, privileges, powers, and immunities the constructive trustee
has, and what the beneficiary has. An examination will, I believe, disclose that while 'at law' the constructive trustee has everything, 'in equity' he has in the typical Anglo-American jurisdiction,
nothing at all, except a power to give a good title to a bona fide
purchaser for value. Test it and see. Suppose the 'land' consists of a house and lot. 'At law' the trustee has the privilege to
tear the house down. Equity would, however, at the suit of the
grantor, the cestui of the constructive trust, enjoin the destruction,
pending a hearing on an application for reformation, i.e., there is
an equitable duty not to destroy. Which is paramount? The
equitable duty, as we all know. Again, at law the trustee has the
privilege to sell to anyone he pleases; in equity an injunction may
be had, there is an equitable duty not to sell. The trustee sells
the extra land to a bona fide purchaser, or even a male fide purchaser. At law the trustee may keep the money; in equity he must
give it to the beneficiary. The trustee goes to Europe; a stranger
is about to destroy the house. Would Judge Cardozo hesitate to
preserve the property-the physical property-not the intangible
obligation of the trustee-at the request of the beneficiary? I
think not. Ettinger v. PersianRug Co. (1894) 142 N. Y. 189;
w See the paper printed in FiVE LzcruEs oN LEGAL Topics oF TH. AssocrATION OF THE BAR OF THE CIry OF NEw YoRx (1928) 337, 351 et seq.
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Amparo Mining Co. v. Fidelity Trust Co. (1909) 75 N. J. Eq. 555;
Kelly v. Larkin & Carter L. R. (1910) 2i Ir. 550 (K. B.) Run

dear through the whole list-and at almost eveiy point the common law rights of the trustee are nullified by the existence of
paramount equitable rights of the beneficiary--except at one point
-both courts agree that the trustee has a power (but, note well,
not the privilege) to give a good title to a bona fide purchaser for
value. It is sometimes said that the constructive trustee is under
an equitable duty to hold or to exercise his common law rights
for the beneficiary. Equitable duty not to destroy or not to sell
is not and cannot be a duty to exercise the common law privilege
to destroy or sell for the benefit of the cestui. Such a statement is

not only meaningless but logically contradictory.

78

As previously indicated, writers who treat "title" as something one
either has 6r has not, though it may be subject to an equitable right in
personam, a so-called "equity," nevertheless actually do recognize different types of "title" or "ownership," and thereby necessarily recognize that a divided "ownership" of objects may exist. There is, for
example, the usual full ownership "title"; tlere is the "legal title" of
the constructive trustee, which is subject to an "equity"; etc. If one
reads the Sales Act, he finds at once that it recognizes that a title may
be held "merely for purposes of security." 79 And the learned draftsman
of that act has pointed out in a recent article that while "the idea that
title is always the same and always carries with it identical consequences
is instinctive with many lawyers," it is "easy to demonstrate the contrary."8 0 In discussing the matter he goes on to say:
"The conception of divided ownership was doubtless almost entirely the creation of courts of equity derived from their compulsion of owners to deal with their ownership according to good conscience. But this desirable and convenient conception has been
taken over into the law in many cases and remedies at law are often
adequate to achieve results originally reached only in equity. Illustrations might be multiplied. A fraudulent buyer of a chattel
acquires ownership but the defrauded seller need not now seek
rescission in equity, 'but may sue for conversion. Nevertheless,
following the equitable doctrine, courts of law protect an innocent
purchaser for value from the fraudulent buyer." 81
Ibid., 356.

rUNIFoRM
SALEs AcT §20.

0Williston, Ownership of Goods Shipped under a Bill of Lading to Sellers
Order (1933), 82 U. OF PA. L. REv., 1, 3.
aIbid.

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
However, in discussing the type of analysis advocated in the present
article he says:
"It has been pointed out that 'title' is something variable in
different cases, since its possessors do not always have the same
legal relations to other persons. This is doubtless a sound juristic
conception, but it is practically impossible always to state specifically what rights, powers, privileges and immunities an owner
has in a particular case. For one reason, the intrinsic difficulty
and complication of such a mode of statement render it impossible
of universal application. Lawyers must have some shorter mode
of expression. Furthermore, the lengthened statement requires
at the outset a knowledge of all these rights, powers, privileges and
immunities. This is impossible. Those who suggest it fail to
take into account the way the law has grown, and apparently is
growing, namely, by first determining the attribute of ownership
or title and then deducing consequences therefrom. It is at least
possible, however, without imposing too elaborate terminology on
a practical profession, to distinguish from full ownership not only
the bare title that an ordinary trustee has, but a title held merely
82
for purposes of security."
With much that the learned writer says there can be no disagreement.
It is impossible to talk or write without using verbal shorthand, and
nothing in the present paper should be construed as asserting the contrary. No one, for example, would advocate doing away with such
shorthand expressions as "ownership" and "possession"; these are as
useful for lawyers as, e.g., terms like "carbon dioxide" and "sodium
chloride" are for chemists. But we must be careful not to misinterpret
or misuse our shorthand. If chemists were, e.g., to use "carbon dioxide" now for one combination of molecules and now for another, or
without finiding out just what it did stand for, the situation would be
more or less comparable to many uses by legal writers of their terms
"ownership," "title," and similar expressions. 83
Moreover, it seems to the present writer doubtful whether in fact
"the law has grown and apparently is growing, by first determining the
attribute of ownership or title and then deducing consequences therefrom." Is this not to confuse the ex post facto reasoning of judicial
opinions with the real reasons which led to those decisions? To be
'Ibid., note 8.
= Note how in the passage quoted in the text dealing with "divided ownership"
the learned author nevertheless a few lines farther on states that 'a fraudulent
buyer of a chattel acquires ownership."
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kept in mind are two things: (1) one can deduce a conclusion applicable
to the world of fact only when one knows the meaning of the terms
used in his premises ;84 (2) the conclusion, so far as it is nothing but
a purely logical deduction, merely makes explicit what is implicitly
stated by the premises. 8 5 Consequently, if a case presented to a court
is "new," i.e., raises the question whether in the particular case before
it a given legal xelation (claim, privilege, power, or immunity) is to be
recognized for the first time; the court cannot solve its problem intelligently unless it realizes that "to determine the attribute of ownership
or title" will be to determine whether the given specific relation in question is to be recognized or not. The assertion of the "attribute of ownership or title" is thus in truth nothing more than a recognition of a result
already reached on other, though not always consciously recognized,
80
grounds, rather than a reason for that result.
We may make the foregoing somewhat abstract discussion more concrete by noting the difficulties produced by first attributing title or
ownership without knowing when we do so just what legal relations we
mean to denote, and then trying to "deduce" the answer to a specific
problem. An excellent example is given by Professor Williston himself in the paper from which we have quoted. It grows out of the
wording of Sec. 20 of the Sales Act, which reads:
"Where goods are shipped, and by the bill of lading the goods
are deliverable to the seller or his agent, the seller thereby reserves
the property in the goods. But if, except for the form of the bill
of lading, the property would have passed to the buyer on shipment
of the goods, the seller's property in the goods shall be deemed to be
only for the purpose of securing performance by the buyer under
the contract."
Note the wording of this statement: "conclusion applicable to the world of
fact." One can of course "deduce" from the "statements" that "all x's are ys"
and "all y's are z's" the conclusion that "all x's are z's," but until a meaning is
given to x, y, and z the "statements" have no meaning and cannot be applied to

a factual situation.
'The statement in the text is not intended to deny the utility of "logic."
Rules of logic are indispensable guides in the consistent use of language, and enable us in a complicated chain of reasoning to discover perhaps for the first time
just what our premises do assert.
"The matter here so briefly dealt with relates to such fundamental problems
as the nature of "logic" and of general principles and rules. The present writer
is aware that the statements in the text are so brief as to be susceptible of serious
misinterpretation. All that can be hoped is that they will suggest a point of
view which has been discussed to some extent in other places and which it is
planned to develop more fully elsewhere. The interested reader may consult
E~ic BELL, THE SEAaca FOR TRUTH (1934). The following passage is particularly
relevant to the discussion in the text: "Any theory which is fabricated by mathe-
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This section of the Act has given rise to differences of opinion as
to the scope of the "rights" (claims, privileges, powers, and immunities)
of the seller and buyer, respectively. The "seller's property in the goods
shall be deemed to be only for the purpose of securing performance
by the buyer under the contract," i.e., is "a title held merely for purposes of security." If the present writer understands Professor Williston, having "determined the attribute of ownership or title," we ought
now to be ready to "deduce the consequences therefrom." Suppose we
ask: Is the risk of loss upon the buyer in such a case? The point here
made is, that unless we know just what legal relations we intend shall
constitute this particular legal molecule-to recur to the figure of speech
used at an earlier point-we cannot by mere logic "deduce" an answer.
This Professor Williston himself recognizes, for he says: "In neither
Act8 7 can the section when taken alone be completely effective, since it
does not itself provide ...

what is the legal effect of the seller's prop-

erty being only for the purpose of securing performance by the buyer
under the contract." Precisely so; and if it were so to provide, it
could do so only by stating just what legal relations do make up this
"title field merely for purposes of security."8 8 As Professor Williston
goes on to point out, Sec. 22 of the Sales Act expressly provides that
the "risk of loss shall" be on the buyer where the seller's "title" is of
this kind.
If we ask next whether the seller on tendering the bill of lading is
entitled to recover the full price, once more we find no answer can be
"deduced" by logic from the mere attribution of "security title" to the
seller. This also Professor Williston recognizes in the article under
discussion, although he expresses the view that all the provisions of
the Act taken together ought to lead courts to one conclusion rather
than another.8 9

To the present writer it seems that the actual baiis for the decisions
which in such cases place the risk of loss on the buyer and also allow
the seller to recover the full purchase price on tender of the bill of
lading is a simple one, vig., that in view of the degree of control vested
in the buyer by such a transaction-he has a legal power by tendering
matical reasoning (or other strict deductive reasoning) from scientific (or other)
hypotheses, and which produces anything more than elaborate tautologies from
those hypotheses, has simply blundered brilliantly, and has produced two rabbits
from a hat which contained only one rabbit."
' §20 of the UNIFORM SALES Acr is identical with §40 of the UNIFORm BILLS
oF

LADING AcT.
"'This
may be

done by appropriate shorthand, without using the precise terminology of claims, powers, etc. An example is §22 of the UNiFORm SALES Acr dealing with the risk of loss.
'See his argument on p. 10 of Ownership of Goods Shipped Under a Bill of
Lading to Seller's Order (1933) 82 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 1, referred to in note 80.
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the price to acquire "full ownership" of the goods9 °- it is only fair that
these other legal incidents should be attached.9 1
Before leaving this part of the discussion, it should be noted that
even for a practical. profession it is hardly adequate to stop with "distinguishing from full ownership" only two other categories, viz., "the
bare title that a trustee has" and "a title held merely for purposes of security." The "title" of a trustee under an express trust is often a
different combination of legal relations from that in a "constructive
trust"; and the "security title" of the mortgagee differs in many respects
from that of the seller of a chattel under a conditional sale, and both
from that of the vendor of land before conveyance.
If now we review our somewhat long drawn out argument and summarize our conclusions, we may say:
1. Whether we consider the case of land or that of chattels, the
common statement that where a sale has been induced by fraud the
buyer has acquired "title" or "ownership" is inadequate and misleading. It would perhaps be nearer the truth to say that the seller retains
ownership, subject to the power of the fraudulent buyer to defeat that
ownership by a sale and transfer to a bona fide purchaser. In truth
neither seller nor buyer is completely "owner." If one chooses to attribute a "voidable title" to the buyer in such cases, perhaps no great
harm is done if one realizes just what that phrase means,92 and that'
it is rather a description of the legal results reached than a reason for
93
those results.
'In WLIsToN, SALEs (1924) §284 it is said that the "right of the buyer"
where the seller "retains title only for security . . . is in its nature an equitable

property right." The important thing seems to be that in all cases of this type the
buyer has the legal power by tendering payment of the price to acquire "a right
to the goods themselves," i. e., to become full owner, and also a further power to
transfer the first power by sale or mortgage.
"It
is possible that when Professor Williston speaks of "deducing consequences" from the "attribution of ownership or title" he is not using "deduce"

in its strict logical sense. See his remarks in The Effeci of One Void Promise
in a Bilaterat Agreement (1925) 25 COL. L. REv. 857, 863: "I think it will be
found that the rule in question is a logical consequence, or indeed application of
the more general rule, if not in a scholastic sense at least in a practical sense."
I It would mean one thing in the case where the seller need return nothing,

and another where he must at least tender a return of the consideration received

before being entitled to recover the goods in replevin.
I Note the realistic language of Mr. Justice Stone in the recent cases of Tyson
& Brothers v. Banton, 273 U. S.418, 47, Sup. Ct. 426, 71 L. ed. 718 (1927) and
Di Santo v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 273 U. S.34, 47 Sup. Ct. 267, 71 L.
ed. 524 (1927).

In the latter, in discussing the "direct" and "indirect" regulation of

interstate commerce by the states, he said: "In this case the traditional test of
the limit of the state action by inquiring whether the interference with commerce
is direct or indirect seems to me too mechanical, too uncertain in its application,
and too remote from authorities, to be of value. In thus making use of the expressions 'direct' and 'indirect' interference with commerce, we are doing little
more than using labels to describe a result rather than any trustworthy formula
by which it is reached."
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2. There is no connection between the "nature" of "rights in ren"
and the rule recognized in most states that "title" i.e., full ownership,
passes to the Sunday buyer.
3. In recognizing that title passes as a result of the Sunday transaction, the law creates on behalf of one of the law-breakers an indefinite
number of legal "rights," which it is difficult to reconcile with the refusal to attach any legal consequences whatever to the promise of the
buyer to pay the purchase price.
4. It is clear that the law first puts the parties into the legal situation in which it alleges it "finds" them, and then refuses to alter the situation it fias itself created, thereby enriching one of the wrongdoers at
the expense of the other, and so in effect fining the latter and handing
the fine over to the former.
5. To provide for the protection of bona fide purchasers for value
from Sunday buyers, if it seems desirable to do so, it is not necessary
to do more than attribute to these buyers legal power to give a good
title to such purchasers.
6. It is therefore abundantly clear that it is entirely possible to
adopt the minority view 94 and yet at the same time to give protection to
bona fide purchasert for value, if that seems socially desirable.95 To
be sure, if this were done the general language used in the opinions of
courts in states holding the minority view, to the effect that the transaction is "void," would have to be treated as inaccurate: sales and delivery on Sunday does give the rights which go with "possession" and
also a legal power to confer a good title upon a bona fide purchaser for
value -without notice. To limit in this way general language used in
opinions is, however, to do nothing more than is done every day by
courts trained in the Anglo-American doctrine of stare decisis: so far
as the language used in judicial opinions covers situations not yet presented for adjudication it is merely obiter dictun and subject to revision as "new" situations present themselves.
For states which have not already passed upon the question under
"That is, the view that the one who has performed his side of a Sunday 'bargain is entitled to regain the goods or land, at least if he does so before a transfer to a bona fide purchaser for value.
" The present writer does not doubt that the "title" theory has aided courts
in reaching the conclusion to protect bona fide purchasers for value. If thought
desirable, therefore, it would be possible to reach the results of the minority view
by attributing a "voidable title" to the Sunday buyer, precisely comparable to
that which the fraudulent buyer is said to get, and to recognize on behalf of
the Sunday seller a "right to reconveyance" of this "title," specifically enforceable at law in the case of chattels, just as in the case of the defrauded seller.

There is curiously little discussion on the part of lawyers of the basis for
the doctrine of bona fide purchase for value as developed by equity. In this connection worthy of consideration is the criticism of the doctrine expressed by Jenks,
The Legal Estate (1908) 24 L. Q. REv. 147.
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consideration and which may desire not to follow the majority rule,
there are two conceivable lines of action: (1) to adopt the minority
view, to the extent of allowing recission of "executed" transactions
before property "transferred" has passed into the hands of bona fide
purchasers for value, but giving protection to such purchasers if that
is regarded as desirable; or (2) to treat Sunday bargains as valid, i.e.,
as entirely unaffected by the penal statutes in question. This latter solution would confine the effects of the statutes to the criminal penalties
provided in them and not extend them by implication beyond their
terms. Much can be said for this solution, since the only illegality involved is in the making on Sunday of otherwise lawful bargains. If it
be said that this would introduce an "exception" to the "general principles" governing "illegal contracts," it may be pointed out that these
"general principles" are already limited by excepfions, and that it would
not be difficult to rationalize the result under discussion in terms of one
or more of these.9 6 So far as the policy of reaching this result is concerned, e.g., if it be argued that we would thereby fail to discourage
sufficiently the transaction of business on Sunday, two things may be
pointed out: (1) it is more than doubtful whether the prevailing view
really does have any appreciable effect upon the conduct of the community, because of the ignorance of practically all laymen of the rule in
question; (2) it is better to do the discouraging consciously and directly
by increasing the penalties of the criminal law, rather than indirectly
and erratically as is the case under the prevailing view.
It is perhaps unlikely, legal traditions being what they are, that an
American court would be bold enough to adopt this solution unless directed so to do by statute, even though its prior decisions had not passed
upon the collateral civil effects of the Sunday statutes. There remains
then the first solution, which, it is contended, is preferable to that reached
-by the majority. In support of this view two grounds may be urged:
(1) it does not reach the erratic and inequitable results of the prevailing view; (2) in all probability it has at least as great a tendency to discourage the making of Sunday bargains as the majority rule. The first
point is obvious and so needs no discussion. As to the second: it may
well be doubted whether either the majority or the minority rule actually
has much influence in the way of discouraging Sunday bargains. It is
an obvious fact that while many of our lay brethren know that they may
be fined for engaging in business on Sunday, practically none of them
are familiar with the rules as to the civil effects of Sunday bargains.
If, contrary to fact, we assume laymen to be familiar with the rules in
question, ,the guess may be hazarded that knowledge that the other
See R.sTArEM N' §600.
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party might, if he repented of his bargain, demand rescission, would
do as much towards encouraging people to refrain from entering irto
such transactions as would knowledge that the majority rule was in
force. Note that under the latter rule if the seller at the time he delivers
the goods insists upon payment on Sunday, the transaction is completely
effective: title has passed to the goods and to the money; the law will
leave the parties where it finds them. Moreover, a dishonest person
who knew the majority rule might perhaps take advantage of the .ignorance of others who did not, by obtaining goods on credit and then
refusing to pay for them.97 All this, of course, is highly speculative;
there is no evidence that in fact the decisions we are discussing have
had any appreciable effect upon the community in the way of discouraging the making of Sunday bargains.
Reference was made above to the action of the American Law Institute in adopting the majority view, and to one probable argument in
favor of that course, viz., that in view of the overwhelming weight of
authority, nothing else could have been done. It is therefore worth while
to note the action of the Institute in connection with the Restatement of
the Conflict of Laws, where it was voted to direct the Reporter on that
subject to redraft a section of the Restatement so that instead of following the overwhelming weight of authority on the point in question it
would state the rule established by the decisions in a single state.9 8 That
similar action was not taken in the case under discussion was therefore
not due to any real impossibility but simply to the fact that the inequitable
character of the law followed in most states has not been brought
home to the majority of the legal profession, this in turn being in large
part due to a failure to realize the inadequacy of the supposedly logical
reasoning used to support the prevailing view.
As Professor Wigmore so vigorously pointed out long ago in the
passage previously quoted, 99 the whole doctrine underlying the maxim
Possibly the existence at the time of the making of the bargain of an intention not to pay for the goods would be "fraud" sufficient to allow a recovery of
the goods, under the doctrine that a plaintiff who has been induced by "fraud" to

part with property is not "in pari delicto" with the defendant. See
QuAsi-CoNTRAcrs

(1913)

§141.

WOODWARD,

' THE AmalICAN LAW INSTITTE: PROCEEDINGS (1931) Vol. IX, pp. 144-156.
The section in question was "referred back to the Reporter and his Advisers for
consideration, with an expression of opinion by this body that this should be stated
otherwise," There was only one case in a single state contrary to the rule as
stated and disapproved by the Institute; two states had changed the law by statute.
The Reporter referred to the single case in question as "very well reasoned."
(Since the foregoing was written the final text of the Restatement has become
available, and apparently the learned Reporter and his advisers felt they could
not escape following the weight of authority: see Section 614 (1934) RESTATEMENT
OF THE CONFLICr OF LAWS.
' In note 5 above.
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"In pan delicto potior est conditio defendentis," and not merely its application to Sunday bargains, needs re~xamination. It is hoped that the
present discussion will call renewed attention to the necessity for such
reexamination, and that the quasi-official prestige of the Restatement will
not prove an insuperable obstacle.

